Published: June 11, 2026 | Updated: June 11, 2026
In Brief
On 5 June 2026, METI and MLIT revised the Operational Guidelines for the Occupancy Public Tender System (一般海域における占用公募制度の運用指針) — the rulebook that governs how offshore wind operators are selected in Japan’s general sea areas. The revision follows the August 2025 withdrawal of the three Round 1 projects and codifies four changes: a scoring price floor, business-feasibility scoring raised to parity with price, granular checklist-based feasibility scoring, and a reduced weight on construction speed paired with greater schedule flexibility. The per-bidder award cap and the detailed withdrawal rules are not in this revision — they will be set in each zone’s tender-specific guidelines.
Japan has now formalised the auction reforms it has been debating since the collapse of Round 1. The June 2026 revision does not introduce a new policy direction so much as write the agreed direction into binding rules, with the point allocations finally confirmed. For developers, EPCs, and lenders weighing a return to the Japanese market, the practical question is no longer what the reform intends, but how bids will now be scored — and whether the new design changes the calculus on which projects can clear a lender’s threshold.
Why the rulebook was revised — and why now
The trigger was concrete. In August 2025, the Mitsubishi Corporation-led consortium withdrew from all three Round 1 zones — Noshiro-Mitane-Oga, Yurihonjo, and Choshi — removing roughly 1,742 MW from the pipeline, about 17% of Japan’s 2030 target. METI’s joint offshore wind working group analysed the withdrawal from September 2025, ran a public consultation from 22 January to 22 February 2026, and published the revised guidelines on 5 June 2026.
This matters for sequencing. Japan operates two parallel rulebooks for offshore wind in general sea areas: the Zone Designation Guideline and the Operational Guideline for the tender itself. The Zone Designation Guideline has been moving through its own 2026 revision process, with the proposed additions to the guideline text narrowly scoped to marine-environment survey provisions and wind-turbine-to-shipping-lane spacing. The higher-profile shift toward earlier business-viability screening is being implemented operationally, within the existing guideline framework, rather than written into the guideline itself. With the June 2026 Operational Guideline revision now confirmed, the post-Round 1 reset has moved decisively from working-group conclusions into the operative framework that will govern Round 4 and any re-tender of the withdrawn zones.
👉 Why Japan’s Offshore Wind Round 1 Ended in Withdrawal
👉 Japan’s Offshore Wind Promotion Zone Guideline Revision (March 2026)
The four codified changes
1. A scoring price floor — the “assumed supply price range” (想定供給価格幅)
Each tender now defines an assumed supply price range: the band between (a) the price judged necessary to complete the project assuming realistic, achievable efficiency gains, and (b) the supply price cap. A bid at or below the bottom of that band receives a flat 120 price points — the maximum. Bidding any lower earns nothing more. The price point assigned at the cap, and the width of the range, are set for each tender based on the prevailing business environment; bids above the cap remain non-compliant.
The effect is straightforward: the unlimited reward for ever-lower bids is gone. Price competition now operates inside a defined band, directly targeting the dynamic that produced Round 1’s 11.99–16.49 JPY/kWh bids — prices that proved incompatible with the cost environment that followed.
2. Feasibility now carries equal weight to price (120 : 120)
Supply price and business-feasibility factors are now weighted 1:1 — 120 points each. The internal allocation of the feasibility score has also been reworked, with implementation capacity and regional factors split 80:40:
| Evaluation axis | Points |
|---|---|
| Supply price (価格点) | 120 |
| Business feasibility (事業実現性) | 120 |
| Implementation capacity (事業の実施能力) | 80 |
| Construction speed (迅速性) | 10 |
| Plan foundation — track record & finance (基盤面) | 20 |
| Plan execution — build & O&M (実行面) | 25 |
| Supply chain & stable supply (電力安定供給・SC形成) | 25 |
| Regional coordination & ripple effects (地域との調整等) | 40 |
| Coordination with authorities (調整能力) | 10 |
| Navigation & fisheries coexistence (協調・共生) | 10 |
| Regional economic ripple (地域経済波及) | 10 |
| National economic ripple (国内経済波及) | 10 |
The consequence is that a developer can no longer win on price alone. With the price band narrowed and feasibility raised to parity, a strong feasibility case — financing depth, supply-chain commitments, execution realism — now counts for as much as the headline number.
📘 Offshore Wind Project Selection Criteria: Japan’s Scoring System
3. Granular, checklist-based feasibility scoring
Feasibility is now scored against explicit checklist items rather than broad tiers. Each item is split 1:1 between “basic” criteria (is the item addressed at all?) and “advanced” criteria (is the content detailed, specific, and certain?). The score for each item is calculated as:
Score = allocated points × ( checklist items met ÷ total checklist items )
Vague, high-level submissions now score poorly by construction. The framework rewards concrete, evidenced plans — reserved vessel slots and signed term sheets rather than indicative quotes. This is the mechanism that turns “deliverability” from a stated aspiration into a measured outcome.
4. Speed downweighted to 10 points, with built-in schedule flexibility
Construction speed (迅速性) is now worth 10 points, scored on a relative basis against the fastest credible bidder. Two safeguards prevent a fast-but-flimsy schedule from scoring well. First, a feasibility gate: if a bidder’s combined plan-foundation and plan-execution score falls below 50% of maximum (below 22.5 of 45), the speed score is zero. Above that, the speed score is scaled by the feasibility ratio. Second, speed is measured only after an appropriate buffer period (予備期間) is built into the schedule, and projects may now set operating periods beyond 20 years (for example, 25 years).
The combined effect is that developers are no longer pushed toward unrealistically fast timelines to win points. Schedule realism is protected, and deliverability is rewarded over haste — a direct response to the schedule pressure that contributed to Round 1’s unravelling.
What is not in this revision — award caps and withdrawal rules
The general guidelines set the framework; some of the most-discussed reform items are deliberately left to each zone’s tender-specific guidelines (公募占用指針). Two in particular will be defined zone-by-zone, not in the general rulebook:
- The per-bidder award cap (落札制限) — for example, the reinstated limit on how much capacity a single bidder may win.
- The detailed rules for when a selected operator withdraws (撤退時のルール) — including penalties and the obligation to provide seabed survey data to future bidders.
Readers tracking the headline numbers on these points should expect them in each zone’s tender documents as they are issued, not in the June revision itself.
The DeepWind read — a pivot from price to deliverability, not a cure for the viability gap
This is the clearest formal acknowledgment yet that price-led selection contributed to Round 1’s collapse. The state is structurally rebalancing the auction toward projects that can actually be built and financed — narrowing price competition, raising feasibility to parity, and rewarding evidenced execution over speed.
“Policy can reshape how projects are selected. It cannot reshape the economics of building them. Better rules make a non-viable bid harder to win — they do not make a difficult project bankable.”
Consistent with the DeepWind Lens — Policy Design → Execution Reality → Bankability Test — the revision reduces selection and process risk but leaves project economics untouched. The re-tendered zones will still run under FIP zero-premium without LTDA access: revenue depends on wholesale prices, while WACC, FX, and CAPEX exposure sit entirely outside the reach of scoring rules.
The price floor itself carries a design tension worth watching. The band must sit high enough for projects to be viable, yet low enough to contain national cost burden. That calibration does not happen in the general guideline — it happens in each zone’s assumed supply price range. The substantive decisions, in other words, have moved down a level, into the zone-specific tenders.
👉 Offshore Wind Cost in Japan: CAPEX, OPEX and LCOE Explained
What it means for developers, EPCs, and lenders
The practical shift is from price aggression to evidenced deliverability. The levers that now move outcomes are concrete: locked supply-chain slots, demonstrated financing depth, realistic schedules with buffers, and granular, certain plans. With the feasibility block carrying more differentiating spread than the narrowed price band, price alone no longer dominates the result.
For lenders, the framework’s pivot toward feasibility brings the selection criteria closer to a bankability test — but the underlying revenue and cost risks that determine debt-service coverage are unchanged. Whether a winning bid is financeable still turns on the same variables it always did. To see how a given supply price translates into LCOE, project IRR, and minimum DSCR under realistic WACC and FX assumptions — for the three withdrawn zones specifically — the DeepWind Viability Simulator models them directly.
Frequently asked questions
What changed in Japan’s offshore wind auction rules in June 2026?
METI and MLIT revised the Operational Guidelines for the Occupancy Public Tender System, codifying four changes: an “assumed supply price range” that caps the reward for low bids at a flat 120 points; business-feasibility scoring raised to 120 points (equal to price); checklist-based, granular feasibility scoring; and construction speed reduced to 10 points with greater schedule flexibility.
What is the “assumed supply price range” (想定供給価格幅)?
It is a price band defined for each tender, between the price judged necessary to complete the project with realistic efficiency gains and the supply price cap. Bids at or below the bottom of the band receive the maximum 120 price points, so there is no scoring benefit to bidding lower. The band’s width and the point value at the cap are set per tender based on the business environment.
Does the revision apply to the withdrawn Round 1 zones?
Yes. Any re-tender of Noshiro-Mitane-Oga, Yurihonjo, or Choshi will be conducted under these revised rules. The zone-specific details — including award caps and withdrawal penalties — will be set in each zone’s tender-specific guidelines.
Are the per-bidder award cap and withdrawal penalties part of this revision?
No. The general guidelines set the framework, but the award cap (落札制限) and the detailed withdrawal rules (撤退時のルール) are deliberately left to each zone’s tender-specific guidelines (公募占用指針).
Related reading
- 📘 Japan Overhauls Offshore Wind Auction Rules to Ensure Project Completion
- 📘 Offshore Wind Project Selection Criteria: Japan’s Scoring System
- 📘 Why Japan’s Offshore Wind Round 1 Ended in Withdrawal
- 📘 Japan’s Offshore Wind Policy & Regulatory Framework Explained
Source: METI / MLIT, “Operational Guidelines for the Occupancy Public Tender System in General Sea Areas” (revised June 2026); METI press release, 5 June 2026. DeepWind provides evidence-based analysis and does not make bidding recommendations.